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Title: The Effect on Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University‟s Reporting Culture 
from Implementing an Aviation Safety Action Program 
 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2012 
The Flight Training Department at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona 
Beach, has been contemplating implementing an Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP) in order to help protect students and instructors from certificate action.  This 
feasibility study analyzed what motivated instructor pilots to submit safety reports, and if 
an ASAP would increase reporting from instructor pilots.  It also identified what concerns 
existed among instructors and managers regarding an ASAP.  A survey was given to 
instructors and managers; also instructors in leadership roles were interviewed.  It was 
found that the benefit to the organization and peers was the highest motivation factor to 
submit safety reports and no significant evidence existed for an increase in reporting 
under an ASAP.  In fact, instructors and managers were concerned with Federal Aviation 
Administration involvement and with the potential for an ASAP to decrease reporting.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Safety of an organization is usually an economic problem (Wood, 2003).  In the 
1800‟s, the industrial revolution was in progress and there was no organized effort to 
reduce accidents or injuries.  If the accident were the fault of the company, the worker or 
their families would have to hire a lawyer to take the company to court, which almost 
never worked.  The company could simply outlast them.  However, that all changed when 
the idea of workers compensation migrated to the United States and by 1930 all states 
had workers compensation laws on the books. The employer through a mandatory 
insurance scheme paid the costs of the program where the premiums were based on the 
company‟s accident record.  Suddenly, it became clear to the employer that it was 
cheaper to not have the accident in the first place than it was to pay for the results of it 
(Wood, 2003). 
Accidents and incidents cause direct and indirect costs associated with them 
(Wood, 2003).  In addition, it is argued that safety is an ethical obligation of 
organizations and sometimes is required to maintain certain safety standards by 
regulation.  Organizations that choose to take a proactive stance on safety will usually 
develop a safety program within their organization with the mission of reducing accidents 
(Wood, 2003). 
The Federal Aviation Administration‟s (FAA) mission is to provide the safest, 
most efficient aerospace system in the world (FAA, 2011b).  The FAA has begun the 
rule-making process to require airports and Part 121 air carriers to develop and 
implement a Safety Management System (SMS).  The essential idea for any SMS is to 
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provide for a systematic approach to achieving acceptable levels of safety risk (FAA, 
2011b).  An SMS is comprised of four functional components (Safety Policy, Safety 
Assurance, Safety Risk Management, and Safety Promotion), including an intangible, but 
always critical, aspect called safety culture (FAA, 2011b). 
Significance of the Study 
One of the cornerstones of an SMS is a safety-reporting program (FAA, 2011b).  
A safety-reporting program enables members of an organization to report hazards that 
can lead to an aircraft accident or incident.  The success of a safety program goes beyond 
the physical capabilities of the program but also relies on the existence of a strong 
reporting culture within the organization.   
Currently Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) has an internal event 
reporting system used by its instructors, students, and other employees called an Event 
Reporting System or Aviation Safety Reports (AvSRs).  The FAA has a formal voluntary 
safety-reporting program for certificated operators known as the Aviation Safety Action 
Program (ASAP) (FAA, 2002).    ASAP encourages a certificated operator‟s employees 
to report safety information that may be critical in preventing accidents.  ASAP 
formalizes the collection, analysis, and retention of safety data.  It also resolves safety 
issues, reported through an ASAP, through corrective action rather than through 
punishment or discipline.  In fact, the ASAP encourages the reporting of safety issues or 
events that involve non-compliance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 
CFR) through enforcement related incentives that are designed into the program (FAA, 
2002). 
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Statement of the Problem 
ERAU employs an internal aviation safety reporting program that does not 
involve the FAA.  The program is supported by a strong organizational safety culture that 
stimulates the reporting of safety issues.  The College of Aviation has a safety department 
that manages the internal safety reporting program.  The safety department has its own 
formal processes for the collection, analysis and retention of safety data.  The safety 
department also recommends corrective action to the College of Aviation‟s and the Flight 
Department‟s leadership.  Though ERAU has its own successful internal safety reporting 
program, there may be additional benefits derived from implementing a formal ASAP.  
However, the change in internal processes or involvement of the FAA in ERAU‟s 
internal reporting program could negatively affect their entire safety program.   
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of ERAU implementing 
a formal ASAP program, as defined in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-66B (FAA, 
2002) and identifying the impact on safety of ERAU‟s flight program. 
Research Questions 
What currently motivates ERAU instructor pilots to report safety events? 
Would ERAU‟s implementation of an ASAP increase safety reporting among instructor 
pilots? 
What concerns exist among instructor pilots and flight department management in 
implementing an ASAP program? 
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Delimitations 
This study was limited to exploring the impact on the safety culture of ERAU‟s 
Daytona Beach flight department, if they were to implement a formal ASAP program.  
The study was limited to the perceptions of instructor pilots and management personnel 
within the flight department at ERAU, Daytona Beach.   
Limitations and Assumptions 
This study was limited to the current perceptions relating to the possibility of 
implementing an ASAP, rather than a comparative study between the perceptions pre-
implementation and post-implementation of an ASAP.  It was assumed that all responses 
given in the surveys and structured interviews were truthful and correct by all 
participants. 
Definition of Terms 
ASAP  A formal FAA voluntary safety-reporting program for certificated 
operators that offers certain enforcement-related incentives for 
FAA certificated personnel of the operator (FAA, 2002). 
AvSR  An ERAU internal Aviation Safety Report that can be submitted 
voluntarily by ERAU employees and students (ERAU, 2011a).   
ERC  A committee that reviews the reports submitted under ASAP and 
determines corrective action.  The ERC is a representative from the 
company, the pilot group or union, and the FAA.  All decisions 
made by the ERC must be unanimous consensus (FAA, 2002). 
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IPQC  A council of instructor pilots elected by their peers in order to 
represent instructor pilots on various workgroups with ERAU 
Flight Department leadership (ERAU, 2011a). 
SMS  A systematic approach to achieving acceptable levels of safety 
risk. An SMS is comprised of four functional components: Safety 
Policy, Safety Assurance, Safety Risk Management, and Safety 
Promotion (FAA, 2011b). 
List of Acronyms 
AC Advisory Circular 
ASAP Aviation Safety Action Program 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
AvSR Embry-Riddle Aviation Safety Report 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
ERAU Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
ERC Event Review Committee 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FOM Flight Operations Manual 
IP Instructor Pilot 
IPQC Instructor Pilot Quality Council 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
SMS Safety Management System 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
Aviation Safety Program 
 Wood (2003) explains the importance of an organization having a safety program: 
It is easy to spot an organization that does not have a safety program.  There is no 
internal reporting system; no deliberate selection of standards; no investigation or 
resolution of incidents or hazards; and (worst of all) no knowledge on the part of 
top management as to whether things are safe or unsafe. (p. 12) 
Many organizations rely on the fact that they have not had an accident recently; they do 
not need to take a proactive stance in investing in an Aviation Safety Program.  However, 
not having an accident recently is not a good measure of an organization‟s safety culture 
(Wood, 2003). 
 Safety culture.  Ron Westrum (as cited in Reason, 2008), an American social 
scientist, classified safety culture into three kinds: generative, bureaucratic (or 
calculative) and pathological.  A major distinguishing feature is the way in which an 
organization deals with safety-related information – or, more specifically, it is about how 
they treat the bearers of bad news: 
 Generative or high-reliability organizations encourage the upward flow of 
safety-related information.  They reward the messengers, even when they are 
reporting their own potentially dangerous errors.  They share a collective 
mindfulness of the hazards, respect expertise and are reluctant to simplify 
interpretations.  They expect bad things to happen and work hard to prepare 
for the unexpected. 
7 
 
 Bureaucratic or calculative organizations – the large majority – occupy the 
middle ground.  They don‟t necessarily shoot the messenger, but they don‟t 
welcome him or her either.  Bad news and novel ideas create problems.  They 
tend to be „by-the-book‟ organizations that rely heavily on administrative 
controls to limit performance variation on the part of the workforce.  Safety 
management measures tend to be isolated rather than generalised.  They 
prefer local engineering fixes rather than widespread systemic reforms. 
 Pathological organisations are inclined to shoot the messenger.  They really 
don‟t want to know.  Whistle-blowers are muzzled, maligned and 
marginalized.  The organization shirks its safety responsibilities, doing only 
the bare minimum necessary to avoid prosecution and keep one step ahead of 
the regulator.  It punishes or covers up failures and discourages new ideas.  
Production and the bottom line are the main driving forces (Reason, 2008, 
p.86). 
 Reason (as cited in Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011) defined several components of 
a safety culture.  They describe the traits an organization should demonstrate in order to 
foster a positive safety culture:  
 Informed culture – Safety management is largely a practice driven by 
decision-making.  Consistent decision-making is supported by acquisition 
and use of sound information.  Thus, an organization that constantly 
informs itself is more likely to succeed both in business and safety 
performance.   
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 Reporting culture – A key source of safety information comes from 
reports from all levels of the organization.  An organization must then 
make sense of the acquired data by turning the reports into useful 
information through analysis.  
 Just culture – „an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, 
even rewarded, for providing essential safety related information but‟. 
However, it must also be a culture „in which they are also clear about 
where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior‟.  
 Flexible culture – when an organization „possesses the ability to 
reconfigure themselves in the face of high tempo operations or certain 
kinds of danger‟. 
 Learning culture – Reporting and other data collection are of little value 
unless accompanied by sound analysis.  This doesn‟t always have to take 
the form of sophisticated analytical or statistical methods.  Simple review 
and discussion of reports, audit findings and other data is often all that is 
required. (pp. 146-147) 
 Reporting and just culture.  Stolzer et al. (2011) highlighted how a just culture can 
affect a reporting culture: 
There are two proven ways to kill a safety reporting system – burn the reporter or 
burn the data.  If safety reports are used as a source of information for disciplinary 
action, the reporting system will likely suffer an almost immediate demise. 
Employees will quickly lose trust in the organization‟s motives.  The second way is 
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slower but just as deadly to the system.  If employees are not convinced that the 
organization is serious about acting on the situations that they report, they will 
ultimately lose faith in the system and discontinue using it.  (p. 146) 
 On January 25, 2000, Dr. Lucian Leape, a Harvard professor of health, testified 
before Congress on what he saw as the state of healthcare safety in the U.S. (Marx, 
2009).  He told Congress that the single greatest impediment to error prevention in the 
medical industry is that “we punish people for making mistakes” (p. 3).  A co-author of 
the Institute of Medicine‟s (IOM) report, To Err is Human, Leape cited that study‟s 
estimated 44,000 to 98,000 annual deaths that were caused as result of medical error 
alone.  He said that healthcare providers would often only report what they could not 
hide.  (Marx, 2009) 
 Sometimes „just‟ or „non-punitive reporting‟ is confused with being free from any 
form of discipline (Stolzer et al., 2011).  However, it is important that an organization has 
clearly stated standards that are consistently and fairly enforced.  An organization‟s 
members must know what is expected of them in terms of behaviors and performance, 
but they also need to be assured that they will not be sanctioned for reporting safety 
problems even when they result from inadvertent errors.  (Stolzer et al., 2011) 
 Voluntary reporting systems.  One of the most important aspects of incident 
investigation has been data collection (Lee & Weitzel, 2005).  Although incidents occur 
more often than accidents, an incident can only be investigated if it has been reported.  
Thus, developing an effective incident reporting system is fundamental to incident 
investigation.  (Lee & Weitzel, 2005) 
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 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).  The ASRS is a voluntary program 
allowing pilots to submit aviation safety incident reports that can be analyzed in order to 
reduce the likelihood of an aviation accident.  To improve the effectiveness of the system 
by increasing the flow of information from its users, the agency eventually transferred the 
operational authority to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The 
new administration is non-regulatory and guarantees confidentiality to all users of the 
reporting system.  FAA (2011c) prohibits the use of any information submitted through 
the ASRS toward any disciplinary action, except information regarding criminal offenses 
or accidents.  When a violation of CFRs comes to the attention of the FAA from a source 
other than a report filed with NASA under the ASRS, then the FAA will take appropriate 
enforcement action; enforcement-related incentives are available, if the person submitted 
a report under ASRS.  Neither a civil penalty nor certificate suspension will be imposed 
against a person found in violation of the CFRs, if he or she filed a report under ASRS. 
This conditional immunity is granted as long as: (a) the violation was inadvertent and not 
deliberate; (b) the violation did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or lack of 
qualification or competency; (c) the person has not been found in any prior FAA 
enforcement action to have committed a violation in the prior 5 years; and (d) the person 
submitted a report under ASRS within 10 days after the violation. NASA de-identifies all 
incoming reports and uses the information for further analysis to identify trends and 
improve aviation safety. The ASRS analysts provide periodic results and make all reports 
available to the public (FAA, 2011a). 
ASAP.  According to FAA (2002), the purpose of the ASAP is to encourage air 
carrier and repair station employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be 
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critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents.  The FAA has determined that 
identifying these precursors is essential to further reducing the already low accident rate.  
Under an ASAP, safety issues are resolved through corrective action rather than through 
punishment or discipline.  The ASAP provides for the collection, analysis, and retention 
of the safety data that is obtained. ASAP safety data, much of which would otherwise be 
unobtainable, is used to develop corrective actions for identified safety concerns, and to 
educate the appropriate parties to prevent a reoccurrence of the same type of safety event. 
An ASAP is based on a safety partnership that will include the FAA and the certificate 
holder, and may include a third party, such as the employee‟s labor organization. To 
encourage an employee to voluntarily report safety issues, even though they may involve 
the employee‟s possible noncompliance with 14 CFR, enforcement-related incentives 
have been designed into the program. (FAA, 2002) 
FAA (2002) was first published on January 8, 1997.  Since then it has been 
revised twice and the program has evolved since its original inception.  Currently 170 
ASAP Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) are in place between companies, labor 
associations and the FAA.  Many lessons have been learned as the program has continued 
to grow (FAA, 2009). 
Event Review Committee (ERC).   The heart of an ASAP is the ERC.  The ERC 
reviews the reports submitted under an ASAP and determines corrective action.  The 
ERC is a representative from the company, the pilot group or union, and the FAA.  All 
decisions made by the ERC must be unanimous consensus.  Under an ASAP, consensus of 
the ERC means the voluntary agreement of all representatives of the ERC to each decision 
required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  As described in the advisory 
circular, consensus does not require that all members believe that the decision or 
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recommendation is the best one, but only that it falls into their range of acceptable 
outcomes for the particular issue (FAA, 2002).  The Sandia report in 2000 on the ASAP 
at American Airlines analyzed the fast pragmatic safety decisions made by the Event 
Review Team.  The report concluded that: 
 The core of ASAP is the [ERC] whose members are in conflict but work together 
as a productive team to analyze events.  The team must discern meaning in 
complex events, overcoming both uncertainty (lack of information) and 
equivocality (lack of clarity).  At each event, the team faces a recurring test, 
unanimous consensus, that maintains the stability of the overall process.  We 
model the [ERC] interaction using a tile-table metaphor. The members must 
achieve a reasonable balance of views in order to take action.  We suggest that 
this balance is achieved when members adopt a shared set of cultural priorities 
where productive action is paramount.  Sideband communications, particularly 
humor, allow the [ERC] to construct a working buffer around its members and to 
interact effectively and efficiently.  (Ganter, 2000, p. 17)  
Figure 1 shows the composition of the ERC and outside parties that interface with the 
ERC. 
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Figure 1. The ERC. Note. Adapted from “Fast Pragmatic Safety Decisions: Analysis of 
an Event Review Team of the Aviation Safety Action Partnership (SAND2000-1134)“ by 
J. H. Ganter, C. D. Dean, and B. K. Cloer, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
According to a Best Practices for Event Review Committees publication (FAA, 
2009) an ERC‟s success largely depends on the characteristics of the individuals who 
serve as members.  In order for the ERC concept to work effectively, the ERC 
representative must be empowered to make decisions within the context of the ERC 
discussions on a given report.  Senior management and supervisors should not preempt 
their respective ERC representative‟s decision-making discretion for an event reported 
under the ASAP.  If the parties to an ASAP MOU do not permit their respective ERC 
representative to exercise this discretion, the capacity of the ERC to achieve consensus 
will be undermined, and the program will ultimately fail.  (FAA, 2002) 
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ERAU aviation safety program 
Safety is the primary concern at ERAU (2011a).  The University takes a proactive 
stance by emphasizing accident prevention, hazard identification, safety data collection 
and dissemination, comprehensive emergency response procedures, and an active safety 
education program.  The effectiveness of the safety program relies on the unrestricted 
flow of information between instructors, students, staff and maintenance personnel.  
Participation in this program is critical to the continued safety of the University flight 
environment.  Information voluntarily supplied (which does not involve negligence, 
deliberate violations or criminal acts) will not be used for punitive action or implication 
of guilt by anyone participating in this program (ERAU, 2011a). 
Oversight of the safety of the flight department is vested in the Dean of the 
College of Aviation.  The Director of Aviation Safety administers the College of 
Aviation‟s Aviation Safety Program.  The Director of Aviation Safety reports directly to 
the Dean of the College of Aviation (see Figure 2).   
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Figure 2.  Organization structure, ERAU Daytona Beach Flight Training Department.  
Note. Adapted from “ERAU Aviation Safety Program” by R. B. Kelly, 2011. 
 
 
According to ERAU (2011a) the Director of Aviation Safety has the following 
authority: 
1. Define ERAU investigation and reporting procedures for hazards, incidents, and 
accidents. 
2. Develop the necessary forms and instructions for implementing the University 
Aviation Safety Program. 
3. Define and require the reporting of any safety-related event. 
4. Conduct an investigation of any safety-related event. 
5. Require the grounding, if deemed necessary, of any flight student or instructor 
pilot involved in a safety-related event that is under investigation.  Only the 
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Director of Aviation Safety, may lift safety-related groundings.  In the absence of 
the Director of Aviation Safety or Chief Flight Instructor, their designated 
alternates will fulfill this role. 
6. Conduct aviation safety inspections of any ERAU flight-related operation, 
facility, or contractor providing flight-related services. 
7. Represent ERAU regarding aviation safety matters in dealing with government 
agencies and professional organizations. 
8. Assume Embry-Riddle Investigator-In-Charge responsibilities for any accident or 
incident that is reportable under 49 CFR Part 830 (FAA, 2011c), as amended.  
Represent ERAU under the party participant provisions of 49 CFR Part 831 
(FAA, 2011c), as amended. 
According to ERAU (2011a) the Director of Aviation Safety has the following 
responsibilities: 
1. Provide safety oversight of all aircraft maintenance and flight-related activities on 
a daily basis. 
2. Provide aviation safety training as required by the University Aviation Safety 
Program. 
3. Maintain a reporting system for hazards, incidents, and accidents. 
4. Maintain an aviation safety analysis program. 
5. Provide feedback on all identified hazards, incidents, and accidents. 
6. Develop and maintain a pre-accident guide. 
7. Support and promote the University Aviation Safety Program. 
8. Maintain, review, and recommend revision of the Aviation Safety Program. 
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9. Maintain a risk mitigation process that assigns accountability and tracks the 
mitigation efforts to completion. 
10. Facilitate confidential communication between flight students, instructor pilots, 
and flight administration. 
11. Provide reports on aviation safety to University management. 
12. Distribute aviation safety information and conduct regular meetings with flight 
training personnel and flight students. 
13. Provide timely advice and assistance on aviation safety matters to line managers 
at all levels. 
14. Participate in dialogue between safety professionals, Air Traffic Control, airport 
management, the University Aviation Safety Council, and the local community to 
discuss safety-related matters. 
According to ERAU (2011a) under the Director of Aviation Safety, there are Safety 
Leaders who are appointed to represent the aviation safety program at the instructor pilot, 
student and maintenance technician levels.  Safety Leaders are also tasked with assisting 
the Director of Aviation Safety with other duties as assigned.  Safety Leaders‟ 
responsibilities include assisting the Director of Aviation Safety in his or her 
responsibilities and duties (ERAU, 2011a). 
ERAU safety culture.  The ERAU Safety Management System (SMS) is founded 
on the belief that a vibrant Safety Culture is the key to accident prevention (ERAU, 
2011b).  The University President knows that ERAU‟s Safety Culture must be strong to 
prevent accidents and protect the men and women who make up the Safety Culture. 
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The University President has established a written Safety Culture philosophy 
called, Our Commitment to Safety: 
 The well being [sic] and safety of our students, faculty, and staff are of 
paramount importance. Safety is an area that requires deliberate effort and a 
conscious commitment on the part of everyone in order to truly make a positive 
difference. My commitment is to work alongside each of you in ensuring the 
safest environment we can collectively achieve.  
 I encourage open participation and sharing of information, knowledge, 
intelligence, wisdom, and whatever other resources are at our disposal to make 
our workplace safer for all.  
 As the University President, I pledge that no disciplinary action will be taken 
against any person reporting a safety hazard or concern. I further pledge that those 
of you that make significant contributions in improving workplace safety will be 
appropriately acknowledged.   
 Let's all join in creating an atmosphere where safety permeates every part of 
our environment. –John P. Johnson (ERAU, 2011b, p. 6) 
 This Safety Culture philosophy is communicated to employees and students via 
posters and Safety Culture videos containing important safety messages from senior 
university leadership (ERAU, 2011b). 
 The Daytona Beach Flight Training Department also has developed 14 safety 
values that describe and communicate elements of the Safety Culture (ERAU, 2011a).  
These values were developed by a committee comprised of representation from different 
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levels in the organization.  They are communicated to instructors and students via posters 
and video; they are outlined in the ERAU Flight Operations Manual (FOM).  They are: 
 We value: 
 A confidential, trustworthy system to promote and develop safety. 
 The importance that mentorship has on the learning process. 
 The maintenance of a fault and blame free system to minimize human 
error. 
 The sharing of information, knowledge, intelligence, wisdom and 
resources, without reservation, in order to improve safety. 
 Our employees and peers for reporting safety issues and making 
contributions to improve our workplace safety. 
 Our next day of safe operations ahead of us more than our safety record. 
 That the foundation of safety lies in the attitudes and beliefs of each 
individual. 
 That the protection from harm is each individual‟s responsibility and 
requires deliberate effort on their part. 
 The continuous analysis and improvement of our safety performance 
through feedback and communication. 
 The efforts to report and address even the smallest hazard or safety event. 
 The opportunity to learn through human error. 
 The quality and competence of individuals and their motivation to 
continually develop their knowledge, skills, abilities. 
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 The right of any individual to challenge any safety issue to create a safer 
environment. 
 The role teamwork plays in improving safety. (ERAU, 2011a, p. i) 
ERAU’s event reporting system.  Any student, employee, or contract personnel 
observing a hazardous situation, event or concern that could affect flight safety is 
encouraged to report it to the Director of Aviation Safety, Safety Leader, or Duty Flight 
Supervisor by any available means (ERAU, 2011a).  The Director of Aviation Safety will 
provide aviation safety reporting forms (blue forms) in accessible areas for this purpose.  
Reports can also be made via ERAU‟s event reporting system at http://smart.erau.edu.  
Aviation Safety Reports (AvSRs), submitted to the Aviation Safety Department, will be 
kept confidential and be non-punitive.  No student or employee will be punished for 
submitting an AvSR or performing any action self-disclosed in their report except for 
reports that involve: 
1. Criminal Activity 
2. Substance Abuse 
3. Controlled Substances 
4. Alcohol 
5. Intentional falsification 
6. Intentional disregard for safety, or intentional violation of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. (ERAU, 2011a, p. 23) 
 According to D. M. McCune (personal communication, January 15, 2012) the 
Director of Aviation Safety reviews all submitted Aviation Safety Reports.  The Director 
of Aviation Safety determines if any safety issue(s) identified in the report require 
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immediate action.  The Director of Aviation also determines if the report is unacceptable 
for any of the reasons specified for exclusion from the Aviation Safety Program outlined 
in the ERAU Flight Operations Manual (FOM).  The report is then either investigated by 
the Director of Aviation Safety, or delegated to a Safety Leader for investigation.  After 
the report has been investigated, the findings and recommendations are reviewed by the 
Director of Aviation Safety.  The report is then de-identified and retained in the safety 
department‟s database.  Select de-identified reports are distributed to flight department 
staff and management.  Findings and recommendations are forwarded to the appropriate 
line managers and routinely briefed to flight department leadership.  The confidentiality 
of reports are ensured by the Director of Aviation Safety and his aviation safety 
department staff.  Only aviation safety staff knows the identity of submitters of AvSRs.  
Nearly all AvSRs are submitted with the submitter‟s name and contact information for 
follow-up.  The Aviation Safety Department received 336 reports in 2011 at an average 
rate of 51 reports per 10,000 flight hours. (D. M. McCune, personal communication, 
January 15, 2012) 
Summary 
An important element of an Aviation Safety Program or an SMS is an internal 
safety-reporting program.  The success of the program is reliant on a strong safety culture 
that supports the reporting of safety-related issues by front line employees.  The FAA has 
established safety-reporting programs that offer enforcement-related incentives in order 
to encourage the submission of safety-related events from pilots.   
The NASA ASRS is available for all pilots, while an ASAP is only available to 
pilots who work for an FAA certificated operator.  NASA ASRS reports do allow pilots 
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to help improve the overall safety effort, however, the database doesn‟t particularly help 
improve the safety of a specific operator.  Operators need an internal reporting system 
that is specific to their operation, providing data about safety issues the operator needs to 
address.  An ASAP is designed for operators to have their own internal reporting system 
in partnership with the FAA.  Having an ASAP also affords similar, if not arguably more, 
protection than the NASA ASRS program. 
ERAU currently operates an internal safety reporting system.   This program is 
administered by their Aviation Safety Department that is led by the Director of Aviation 
Safety.  The program collects important safety data regarding ERAU‟s flight training 
operation.  The program is designed for strict confidentiality and a commitment of non-
punitive action from submitting AvSRs.  
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
This study consisted of the development of a survey and an interview instrument 
to measure the current safety reporting culture and the possible impact, if the Flight 
Training Department at ERAU (Daytona Beach Campus) was to implement a formal 
ASAP.  A survey was designed to gather the flight instructors‟ perceptions of safety 
reporting and the impact on the reporting culture, if an ASAP was implemented.  A 
structured interview, consisting of a subset of questions contained in the survey, was 
administered to Flight Department management and flight instructor leadership to isolate 
their perceptions on the current safety reporting culture and the perceived impact an 
ASAP would have.  The data were collected using a web-based solution, analyzed with 
statistical treatments and examined to gain insights into the perceptions of the impact of 
formalizing an ASAP.  
Research Approach 
The study was a descriptive study using a quantitative and qualitative mixed-
methods research approach.  The goal was to survey and interview participants to gather 
their subjective perceptions and experiences on the safety-reporting program and of the 
FAA‟s ASAP.   
A 28-item survey was designed to gather data that could characterize the safety 
reporting culture of the organization within the Flight Department; the knowledge base of 
an ASAP; and the desire, concerns and possible consideration of implementing an ASAP.  
The researcher, in coordination with Flight Department management, developed the 
instrument.  Also a collection plan was developed in order to give each flight instructor 
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the opportunity and privacy to take the survey.  The data were collected directly from the 
participants using a computer-based survey tool called SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 
2011) in university computer classrooms.   
A 20-item structured interview was also developed that contained a subset of the 
questions presented on the 28-item survey.  This interview form was used to gather both 
quantitative and qualitative data, comparable to the data collected from flight instructors 
on the survey, but from key leadership in the Flight Department.  All the interviews were 
performed one-on-one by the researcher.  The data were entered directly into 
SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011) during the interview either by the participant or 
the researcher. 
The data were analyzed using SPSS® (IBM, 2010) to find relevant patterns, to 
draw conclusions, and to address the study‟s research questions. 
Population/Sample 
The population used for the survey instrument was all ERAU Flight Department 
instructor pilots.  At the time the survey was administered, the total number of instructor 
pilots employed by the Flight Department was 137.  The number of instructor pilots who 
took the survey was 115.  Assuming a random sample and a population with a normal 
distribution, the results can be used to generalize to the entire population with 95 percent 
certainty (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970).  The structured interview was administered to all 
flight department management personnel to include the Flight Department Chairman, the 
Chief Flight Instructors, the Assistant Chief Flight Instructors, Training Managers and a 
sample of four Instructor Pilot leadership personnel.   
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Data Collection Device 
The survey was administered during the Fall term in 2011.  All of the participants 
in the survey were employed instructors or standards pilots for the Flight Department.  
Participation was voluntary, but the study was fully endorsed by Flight Department 
Management and Supervisors. 
The structured interview was administered to one Flight Department Chairman, 
one Chief Flight Instructor, two Assistant Chief Flight Instructors, five Training 
Managers, two Instructor Pilot Quality Council members, and two Instructor Pilot Union 
leadership representatives.  All of the participants in the interviews were employed by the 
Flight Department.  Participation in the interviews were also voluntary. 
The survey instrument was comprised of a total of 28 items; 27 Items collected 
information data variables of interest, and one item collected free (qualitative) responses 
(see Appendix B). 
A five-choice Likert scale was used to collect information on 22 of the 27 data 
variables.  Of the 22 data variables, 21 of them (Questions 3-11, Questions 14-18 and 
Questions 21-27) used a Likert scale anchored by “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly 
Disagree”.  The other data variable (Question 2) used a Likert scale to measure 
knowledge level from “Very Knowledgeable” to “No Knowledge”.  The other five data 
variables (Question 1, Questions 12-13, and Questions 19-20) were multiple-choice 
options with two of them allowing the selection of more than one answer.   
The structured interview instrument was comprised of a total of 20 items: 14 
items (Questions 2-15) collected information data variables of interest, one item 
(Question 1) collected demographic data, and five items (Questions 16-20) collected free 
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(qualitative) responses (see Appendix C).  A five-choice Likert scale was used to collect 
information on 12 of the 14 data variables.  Of the 12 data variables, ten (Questions 4-13) 
used the Likert scale, anchored by “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree”.  The other 
data variable (Question 3) was used to measure knowledge level from “Very 
Knowledgeable” to “No Knowledge”.  The other two data variables (Questions 14-15) 
were multiple-choice options. 
Both the survey instrument and structured interview were entered into 
SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011), an online data collection web-based service.  
Instructor Pilot survey participants were separated into six groups based on what training 
manager or “team” they reported to.  Each group was scheduled in a university classroom 
with a sufficient number of computers available for each participant.  Each group was 
briefed on the survey by the researcher or one of his designees.  Then the participants 
were provided a SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011), hyperlink to access the online 
survey.  This distribution method controlled access to the instrument.  Participants were 
compensated their normal hourly wage while they took the survey.  Completion times 
ranged from 15 to 30 minutes and participants were given ample time to complete the 
survey.   All of the survey participants‟ responses were captured by SurveyMonkey 
(SurveyMonkey, 2011), aggregated, downloaded and imported into SPSS® (IBM, 2010) 
for analysis. 
The structured interview participants were met one-on-one by appointment with 
the researcher.  The participant and researcher met privately in an available office with a 
computer workstation with internet access.  The researcher briefed the structured 
interview instrument and provided a SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011) hyperlink to 
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the participant.  The participant was seated at the computer and while the researcher 
asked the questions the participant was instructed to enter his responses into 
SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011).  This distribution method controlled access to the 
structured interview data collection instrument.  Participants were compensated at their 
normal hourly wage, if hourly; or they performed the interview during their normal work 
hours, if salaried.  Completion times ranged from 15 minutes to one hour.  All of the 
interview participants‟ responses were captured by SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 
2011), aggregated, downloaded and imported into SPSS® (IBM, 2010) for analysis. 
Instrument reliability.   For the IP perception survey, reliability was tested with 
questions written to elicit the same response: Questions 22 and 23, and Questions 26 and 
27.  For the structured interview, reliability was tested with questions written to elicit the 
same response: Questions 12 and 13.   
Instrument validity.  The researcher implemented actions and selected 
methodologies with the intention of producing results with content validity.  The survey 
instrument was validated by subject matter experts including: Dr. Guy Smith, Department 
Chair – Applied Aviation Sciences; Dr. Tim Brady, Dean of the College of Aviation; Mr. 
David Zwegers, ASAP Analyst, JetBlue; and Mr. Ken Byrnes, Department Chair – Flight 
Training.  Three instructor pilots who work in the Aviation Safety Department also 
reviewed the survey instrument for content validity.  The input from all subject matter 
experts was incorporated into the survey.  The same questions from the survey were 
incorporated into the structured interview, along with the input received from the subject 
matter experts. 
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Treatment of the Data 
Descriptive statistics.  For the IP perception survey, interval data from Questions 
3-11, 14-18, and 21-27 were described using tables to include the N, mean, SD, min and 
max values.  Ordinal data from Questions 1, 2, 12, 13, 19, and 20 were described using 
figures.  For the structured interview, interval data from Questions 4-13 were described 
using tables to include the N, mean, SD, min and max values.  Ordinal data from 
structured interview Questions 2, 3, 14, and 15 were described using figures. 
Reliability testing.  For the IP perception survey, Pearson correlations were 
calculated to test the reliability of Questions 22 and 23, and Questions 26 and 27.  For the 
structured interview, Pearson correlations were calculated to test the reliability of 
Questions 12 and 13.  
Qualitative data.  In the IP perceptions survey, respondents were able to provide 
qualitative data in the comments section.  Selected comments were used in Chapter V to 
provide breadth and depth to the quantitative analysis.  In the structured interview, 
respondents were able to provide qualitative data in four questions (Questions 16-19) 
formatted for qualitative data and in the comments section.  If possible, comments were 
grouped into similar topics and selected comments were used in Chapter V to provide 
breadth and depth to the quantitative analysis. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 IP perception survey.  For the IP survey, 115 valid survey responses were 
reviewed.  Prior to the survey, the instructor pilots were provided a briefing on the ASAP 
by the Director of Aviation Safety during one of their regularly scheduled team meetings.  
The briefing consisted of an overview of what the ASAP entails and how it differs from 
ERAU‟s current event reporting system and NASA‟s ASRS.  Question 1 asked the 
participants if they had in fact received this briefing, to which 83% responded yes and 
17% responded no. See Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Instructor Pilots who received a briefing about ASAP from the Director of 
Aviation Safety. 
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Question 2 of the IP perception survey asked the participants to rank their 
perceived level of knowledge of ASAP.  Of the 115 participants who responded, 57.4% 
reported they had a basic understanding of ASAP, 17.4% reported they were somewhat 
knowledgeable about the ASAP, 14.8% reported they had very little knowledge of 
ASAP, 8.7% reported being very knowledgeable about ASAP, and 1.7% reported having 
no knowledge of ASAP.  See Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Level of knowledge of ASAP among Instructor Pilots. 
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safety reports.  Of the 115 participants who responded to Questions 3-6, four indicated on 
one or more of the questions that they did not currently submit AvSRs.  Since these 
respondents indicated they did not submit safety reports their responses were removed 
from analysis for Questions 3-6.  Table 1 shows Questions 3-6, ranked by the mean from 
highest motivator to lowest motivator. 
 
 
Table 1 
Motivators to Submit AvSRs 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions 7-11 asked the participants what factors de-motivated them from 
submitting AvSRs.  The questions asked on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to 
strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3).  Table 2 
shows Questions 7-11, ranked by the mean from highest de-motivator to lowest de-
motivator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q3. Organization and Peers 111 4.23 .63 2 5 
Q6. Non Punitive 111 3.87 .82 2 5 
Q5. Confidential 111 3.85 1.07 1 5 
Q4. Feedback 111 3.77 .91 1 5 
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Table 2 
De-motivators to Submit AvSRs 
 
 
 
 
 
 In Question 12, participants were asked to indicate the methods they used to 
report a safety-related event that they were involved in.  Question 13 asked what methods 
participants used to report safety-related events they witnessed.  Both questions provided 
the same options: file a NASA ASRS report, file an ERAU AvSR, file an Ops 
Discrepancy report, and do nothing.  Participants were able to select more than one 
option for Questions 12 (involved in a safety-related event) and Question 13 (witnessed a 
safety-related event).  Figure 5 shows the breakdown for responses for Questions 12 and 
13. 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q11. Certificate Protection 115 2.69 1.15 1 5 
Q8. Non Punitive 115 2.37 1.04 1 5 
Q7. Confidential 115 2.15 1.07 1 5 
Q10. Feedback 115 1.88 .84 1 5 
Q9. Organization and Peers 115 1.70 .82 1 5 
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Figure 5.  Breakdown of preferred reporting methods for Instructor Pilots. 
 
 
 
 
In Questions 14-18 and 21, participants were asked what concerned them about 
the supposed implementation of an ASAP.  Questions 14-18 focused on whether the 
participants were concerned about different groups‟ involvement in an ASAP, while 
Question 21 asked whether the participants were concerned about the loss of the current 
reporting system, if an ASAP was implemented.  The questions were asked on a Likert 
scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither 
agree nor disagree (3).  Table 3 shows Questions 14-18 and 21, ranked by the mean from 
highest concern to lowest concern. 
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Table 3 
Areas or Groups that Cause Concern with the Implementation of an ERAU ASAP 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q15. FAA 115 3.28 1.14 1 5 
Q21. Loss of AvSR‟s 115 3.06 1.03 1 5 
Q14. Management 115 2.98 1.00 1 5 
Q18. Students 115 2.83 1.06 1 5 
Q17. Instructors 115 2.45 1.05 1 5 
Q16. Union 115 2.41 .92 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 Question 19 provided five options on who participants felt should be the 
management representative for an ASAP ERC.  The options were: Assistant Chief Flight 
Instructor of Operations, Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, Training 
Manager(s), or Director of Aviation Safety.  They also had an option to specify another 
management position.  Participants could only select one option.  Of the 115 responses; 
47% selected the Director of Aviation Safety, 31.3% selected Training Manager(s), 9.6% 
selected the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Operations, 7.8% selected the Assistant 
Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, and 4.3% selected Other.  See Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Instructor Pilots‟ preferred management ERC representative. 
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representative, grouping the selections for union and IPQC options together, which shows 
47.8% of participants selected a position affiliated with the IP union while 44.3% 
selected a position affiliated with the IPQC. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Instructor Pilots‟ preferred pilot ERC representative. 
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Table 4 
Change in Reporting Habit if an ASAP was Implemented 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q22. More Likely 
to Report 
115 3.01 .79 1 5 
Q23. Less Likely 
to Report 
115 2.84 .82 1 5 
 
 
 
 
Questions 24 and 25 asked the participants how an ASAP would improve safety 
at ERAU.  Question 24 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve safety because more 
reports would be submitted.  Question 25 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve 
safety because an ERC would recommend corrective action.  The questions were asked 
on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of 
neither agree nor disagree (3).  Table 5 shows Questions 24 and 25, ranked by the mean 
from highest perceived improvement on safety at ERAU to lowest. 
 
 
Table 5 
Factors that Would Improve Safety if an ASAP was Implemented 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q25. ERC Corrective Action 115 3.43 .90 1 5 
Q24. More Reports Submitted 115 2.97 .79 1 5 
 
 
 
 
Questions 26 and 27 asked the participants what they felt an ASAP‟s impact on 
safety would be.  Question 26 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a positive impact 
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on safety at ERAU, while Question 27 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a negative 
impact on safety at ERAU.  The questions were asked on a Likert scale from strongly 
agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3).  
Table 6 shows Questions 26 and 27. 
 
 
 
Table 6 
ASAP’s Impact on Safety at ERAU 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q26. Positive 115 3.63 .82 1 5 
Q27. Negative 115 2.39 .84 1 5 
 
 
 
 
Leadership structured interview.  For the descriptive statistics, four IP 
responses were removed to eliminate duplicate data from the IP perceptions survey, since 
the IPs interviewed also took the IP perception survey.  Nine management personnel were 
surveyed and four instructor pilots in leadership positions.  Of the nine management 
personnel who responded to the structured interview; five identified themselves as middle 
management and four identified themselves as upper management.   
The management staff was also provided a briefing on the ASAP by the Director 
of Aviation Safety during one of their regularly scheduled team meetings.  Question 2 
asked the participants if they had in fact received this briefing, to which 100% (9 
managers) answered yes. 
Question 3 of the structured interview asked the participants to rank their 
perceived level of knowledge of ASAP.  Of the 9 management participants: 55.6% 
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reported being somewhat knowledgeable about ASAP, 22.2% felt they had a basic 
understanding about ASAP, 11.1% felt they had very little knowledge of ASAP, 11.1% 
reported being very knowledgeable about ASAP, and 0% reported having no knowledge 
of ASAP.  See Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Breakdown of level of knowledge of ASAP among managers surveyed. 
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neither agree nor disagree (3).  Table 7 shows Questions 4-9, ranked by the mean from 
highest concern to lowest concern. 
 
 
Table 7 
Areas or Groups that Cause Concern with the Implementation of an ERAU ASAP 
  
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q5. FAA 9 2.78 1.30 1 5 
Q9. Loss AvSR‟s 9 2.33 1.03 1 5 
Q6. Union 9 2.33 1.12 1 4 
Q8. Students 9 2.33 1.66 1 5 
Q4. Management 9 2.11 1.17 1 4 
Q7. Instructors 9 1.67 .71 1 3 
 
 
 
 
Questions 10 and 11 asked the participants how an ASAP would improve safety 
at ERAU.  Question 10 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve safety because more 
reports would be submitted.  Question 11 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve 
safety because an ERC would recommend corrective action.  The questions were asked 
on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of 
neither agree nor disagree (3).  Table 8 shows Questions 10 and 11, ranked by the mean 
from highest perceived improvement of safety at ERAU to lowest. 
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Table 8 
Factors that Would Improve Safety if an ASAP was Implemented 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q11. ERC Corrective Action 9 3.78 1.09 1 5 
Q10. More Reports Submitted 9 2.67 1.00 1 5 
 
 
Questions 12 and 13 asked the participants what they felt would be an ASAP‟s 
impact on safety.  Question 12 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a positive impact 
on safety at ERAU, while Question 13 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a negative 
impact on safety at ERAU.  The questions were asked on a Likert scale from strongly 
agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3).  
Table 9 shows Questions 12 and 13. 
 
 
Table 9 
ASAP’s Impact on Safety at ERAU 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Q12. Positive 9 3.89 .93 2 5 
Q13. Negative 9 2.00 1.00 1 4 
 
 
 
 
Question 14 provided five options on who participants felt should be the 
management representative for an ASAP ERC.  The options were: Assistant Chief Flight 
Instructor of Operations, Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, Training 
42 
 
Manager(s), or Director of Aviation Safety.  They also had an option to specify another 
management position.  Participants could only select one option.  Of the nine 
management personnel responses, 44.4% selected the Director of Aviation Safety, 33.3% 
selected Training Manager(s), 11.1% selected the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of 
Operations, 11.1% selected the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, and 0% 
selected Other.  See Figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Management‟s preferred management ERC representative. 
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President, an Instructor Pilot Executive Board Member, or an Instructor Pilot Union 
Steward.  They also had an option to specify another pilot representative.  Participants 
could only select one option.  Of the nine management responses, 44% selected Instructor 
Pilot Quality Council Chairman, 22% selected an Instructor Pilot Executive Board 
Member, 11% selected an Instructor Pilot Quality Council Representative, 11% selected 
Other (specifying an IP independent of the Union), and 11% selected Other (specifying a 
senior standards IP).   Figure 10 shows the breakdown of the selection of pilot ERC 
representative, grouping the selections for union and IPQC options together, and shows 
22% of participants selected a position affiliated with the IP union, while 55% selected a 
position affiliated with the IPQC. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Management‟s preferred pilot ERC representative. 
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Reliability Testing 
For the IP perception survey, Pearson correlations were calculated to test the 
reliability of Questions 22 and 23, and Questions 26 and 27.  For Questions 22 and 23, 
the null hypothesis was: there was no relationship between responses to Question 22 and 
23.  For Questions 26 and 27, the null hypothesis was: there was no relationship between 
responses to Question 26 and 27.  Tables 10 and 11 show the results. 
 
 
Table 10 
Pearson Correlation Between Questions 22 and 23 on the IP Perception Survey 
 More Likely Less Likely 
More Likely Pearson Correlation(Sig) 1 -.565(.000) 
N 115 115 
Less Likely Pearson Correlation(Sig) -.565(.000) 1 
N 115 115 
 
 
Table 11 
Pearson Correlation Between Questions 26 and 27 on the IP Perception Survey 
 Positive Negative 
Positive Pearson Correlation(Sig) 1 -.764(.000) 
N 115 115 
Negative Pearson Correlation(Sig) -.764(.000) 1 
N 115 115 
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 For both, reject the null hypotheses.  There was a relationship between responses 
to Questions 22 and 23, and between responses to Questions 26 and 27. 
For the structured interview, Pearson correlations were calculated to test the null 
hypothesis: there was no relationship between responses to Questions 12 and 13.  Table 
12 shows that the Pearson correlation was statistically significant; therefore reject the null 
hypothesis.  There was a relationship between responses to Questions 12 and 13. 
 
 
Table 12 
Pearson Correlation Between Questions 12 and 13 on the Structured Interview 
 Positive Negative 
Positive Pearson Correlation(Sig) 1 -.943(.000) 
N 9 9 
Negative Pearson Correlation(Sig) -.943(.000) 1 
N 9 9 
 
 
Qualitative Data 
IP perception survey.  For the IP perception survey, 25 of the 117 instructors 
who took the survey provided additional comments to support their responses.  Of the 25 
responses, six were in clear opposition to an ASAP being implemented.  Six responses 
clearly supported an ASAP and recommended implementation.  Five responses 
advocated for more education on the ASAP before implementing it.  Eight responses 
provided concerns or questions and did not clearly advocate for or against an ASAP. 
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Leadership structured interview.  For the structured interview, nine 
management personnel and four instructor pilots in leadership positions were 
interviewed.  For the interview qualitative data, responses from the four instructor pilots 
in leadership roles were considered because there were no equivalent qualitative 
questions on the IP perception survey.  Of the four instructor pilots in leadership roles, 
two were from the instructor pilot union and two were from the Instructor Pilot Quality 
Council. 
In response to Question 16, “Do you feel ERAU should pursue the formation of a 
formal Aviation Safety Action Program?” - Eleven responded yes and two responded no.   
All participants responded to Question 17, “What is your biggest concern with 
formalizing an Aviation Safety Action Program?”  The responses were: 
 Five responded that their concern would be a decrease in the number of 
safety reports.  
 Three responded that they were concerned with the FAA‟s involvement 
with an ASAP.   
 One responded deciding who would be on the ERC.   
 One responded involving students in an ASAP.   
 One responded that an ASAP could slow down the entire safety process.   
 One responded that the union pilots might get more protection than 
managers or non-union pilots.     
 One responded their concern was everyone not understanding their roles 
under an ASAP. 
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All participants responded to Question 18, “What do you feel is the biggest 
motivator for instructor pilots to report safety events?”  Ten responded that the biggest 
motivator was either the safety culture or to improve safety for themselves and peers.  
Only three responded that the biggest motivator was immunity from punitive action of 
some kind. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Discussion 
Both the IP perception survey and the leadership structured interview provided 
insight into the ERAU Daytona Beach Flight Training Department‟s current perspective 
and knowledge of ASAP.  The data from both the IP perception survey and the leadership 
structured interview can help analyze the impact on the safety culture of the Flight 
Training Department from implementing an ASAP.  The impact on the safety culture can 
then be analyzed to determine whether the effect is desired and, if not desired, whether 
the benefits outweigh the negative effect.  The data from the two instruments can also 
provide guidance for flight department leadership for the implementation of an ASAP, if 
leadership should choose to do so.     
The IP perception survey data were analyzed to determine perceptions about the 
following:  
 What level of knowledge of ASAP exists among the IPs? 
 What currently motivates IPs to submit safety reports? 
 What does not motivate IPs to submit safety reports? 
 What are the preferred methods for IPs to report safety-related issues?  
 What would concern the IP population, if ERAU was to implement an ASAP?  
 Who does the IPs feel should make up the ERC? 
 How would an ASAP change safety reporting habits among IPs? 
 Do the IPs feel that an ASAP would improve safety at ERAU and, if so, how? 
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 Do the IPs feel that an ASAP would have a positive or negative impact on 
ERAU‟s overall safety? 
The leadership structured interview data were analyzed to determine perceptions 
about the following:  
 What level of knowledge of ASAP exists among management? 
 What would concern management personnel, if ERAU was to implement an 
ASAP? 
 Does management feel that an ASAP would improve safety at ERAU and, if 
so, how? 
 Does management feel that an ASAP would have a positive or negative 
impact on ERAU‟s overall safety? 
 Who does management feel should make up the ERC? 
 What is management‟s perception of the motivators for IPs to report safety 
issues or events? 
A comparison was also done in the following areas between data collected from 
IPs and management: 
 Level of knowledge of ASAP comparison between IPs and management. 
 Comparison between areas of concern of IPs and management. 
 Comparison between the perceptions of IPs and management, if an ASAP 
would have a positive or negative impact on safety at ERAU. 
 Comparison between the perceptions of IPs and management, if an ASAP 
would improve safety and how it would improve safety. 
 Comparison between IPs and management on who should be on the ERC. 
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 Comparison between what reportedly motivates IPs to report safety concerns 
and what management believes motivates IPs to report safety concerns. 
IP perception survey.  It was the goal of the researcher and for flight department 
leadership that all IPs should receive a briefing on ASAP from the Director of Aviation 
Safety.  The purpose of this briefing was to educate the IPs about the ASAP and to 
encourage them to study the topic more.  However, only 83% of the IPs reported 
receiving the briefing.  It could be that those who did not receive the briefing were not 
working or did not attend the meeting when the briefing on the ASAP was presented to 
their team.   
The data for the knowledge level of ASAP among IPs appears to be normally 
distributed around the mean.  The mean level of knowledge about ASAP among IPs was 
a basic level of understanding.  Though it appears that the IPs knew about the ASAP, 
there was not an adequate level of knowledge to prevent misconceptions about the 
program and to have an educated stance on the benefits or drawbacks of the program.  
Several qualitative statements given by IPs on the IP perception survey support this.  For 
example, one IP commented, “I currently do not have enough knowledge of the ASAP 
system to take a position in regards to pros/cons or versus the ERAU system.”  Four 
qualitative responses advocated for more education on the ASAP. 
 The IPs were asked on the IP perception survey what factors motivated them to 
submit AvSRs.  The highest reported motivator was “the information benefits the 
organization and my peers.”   The standard deviation was smaller than the responses to 
similar questions.  Followed by the benefit to the organization and peers, IPs reported 
non-punitive protection, followed by confidentiality, and then followed by feedback as 
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motivators for submitting safety reports.  All these factors had a mean above the neutral 
point of the Likert scale, making them important aspects to the IPs. 
 The IPs were asked on the IP perception survey what factors de-motivated them 
from submitting AvSRs.  The highest reported de-motivator was “I feel there is no 
personal benefit for myself in regards to certificate protection from the FAA from 
submitting ERAU Aviation Safety Reports.”  Lack of certification protection was 
followed by non-punitive protection, followed by confidentiality, followed by feedback, 
and then followed by benefit to organization and peers.  It is understandable that 
certification protection from the FAA would be cited as the highest de-motivator, as the 
current ERAU aviation safety reporting program does not offer such protection; it would 
only be available through an ASAP.  However, it is interesting to note that the mean 
response to the question regarding certificate protection as a de-motivator was slightly 
below the Likert scale neutral point.  In other words, the mean response was between the 
neither agree nor disagree and the disagree responses.  In fact, for all questions asking 
about what may de-motivate IPs from submitting AvSRs, the mean was skewed towards 
the disagree end of the Likert scale. 
 In Questions 12 and 13 of the IP perception survey, IPs were asked which 
methods they used to report safety-related events, whether they were involved in them or 
witnessed them.  Of the IPs surveyed, 89.7% reported that they submitted an ERAU 
AvSR when involved in a safety-related event.  The next highest method used by IPs 
involved in a safety-related event was submitting an ASRS report (44.4%).  The highest 
reported method for reporting a witnessed safety-related event was also submitting an 
ERAU AvSR (72.6%) followed by informing management.  About 41% of IPs would 
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inform management whether they were involved in a safety-related event or witnessed 
one.  The data show how important the current ERAU AvSR program is, as a vast 
majority of IPs used it to report safety-related events.  It is also interesting to note that 
only 2.6% of IPs reported doing nothing when involved in a safety-related event; 
however, 12% reported doing nothing if they witnessed a safety-related event.  Only 
6.8% of IPs used the NASA ASRS program when they witnessed a safety-related event.  
A possible reason for this is that IPs did not use the ASRS program when it would not 
protect them from certificate action. 
 When IPs were asked about areas of concern with implementing an ASAP 
program, the highest reported concern was the involvement of the FAA.  The second 
highest concern was the loss of the current ERAU AvSR program.  The statistical means 
for both responses about the FAA and the loss of the current reporting system were 
slightly skewed to the Agree side of the Likert scale.  The third highest concern was the 
involvement of management in an ASAP, with a mean centered at the neutral point in the 
Likert scale.  The fourth, fifth and sixth concerns were the involvement of students, 
instructors, and the union, respectively, in an ASAP; with statistical means slightly 
skewed towards the Disagree side of the scale.  The concern about the involvement of the 
FAA in implementing an ASAP was supported by nine qualitative comments submitted 
by IPs in the IP perception survey, which intensified the concern about the FAA being 
involved in ERAU‟s safety reporting program. 
 When IPs were asked who should serve as the management representative to the 
ERC, the most selected person was the Director of Aviation Safety, followed by Training 
Manager(s).  The Assistant Chief Flight Instructors only received 20% of the selections 
53 
 
from IPs.  It seems that more IPs were comfortable having the Director of Aviation 
Safety serve as the management representative to the ERC because the Director of 
Aviation Safety is currently the only management person directly involved in the safety 
reporting program.  This would mean little change in management involvement from 
what is currently in place.    
 In regard to IPs selection of a pilot representative to the ERC, the selections were 
split among the provided options.  No single option got above 30%; the highest selected 
was the IP union president.  There seemed to be an even split between selection of a 
union-affiliated person and an IPQC-affiliated person wherein 47.8% of IPs selected a 
union-affiliated person, while 44.3% of IPs selected an IPQC-affiliated person.  The 
responses provided by IPs did not provide a clear group that the IPs wanted to represent 
them on an ERC, if an ASAP was to be developed. 
 IPs were asked if they would be more likely to submit safety reports if an ASAP 
was implemented at ERAU.   The mean was centered on the neutral point of the Likert 
scale.  The reliability of this question was tested by asking the opposite question and 
testing for a relationship; the Pearson correlation was statistically significant.  There 
wasn‟t evidence that IPs would be more or less inclined to submit safety reports under an 
ASAP. 
 IPs were asked if they felt an ASAP would improve overall safety at ERAU.  In 
one question, they were asked if it would improve safety because IPs would submit more 
reports.  The mean of the responses was centered at the neutral point of the Likert scale.  
In another question, IPs were asked if an ASAP would improve safety because an ERC 
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would recommend corrective action.  The mean was skewed to the Agree side of the 
Likert scale.  
 The IPs were asked in the survey if they felt an ASAP would have a positive or 
negative impact on safety at ERAU.  The reliability of these questions was tested for a 
relationship.  The Pearson correlation was statistically significant.  The mean of 
responses for IPs feeling that an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety at ERAU 
was skewed slightly to the Agree side of the Likert scale. 
Leadership structured interview.  Management staff were also included in the 
briefings regarding the ASAP, along with the instructors they managed.  The interviewed 
management staff all received the briefing on the ASAP from the Director of Aviation 
Safety.   Most managers reported being somewhat knowledgeable about the ASAP and 
all but one reported at least a basic understanding of the ASAP. 
The management staff answered questions identical to questions in the IP 
perception survey regarding areas of the ASAP that may cause concern.  The concern 
with the highest mean was the involvement of the FAA.  The loss of the current safety 
reporting system, involvement of the union and students followed; they had the same 
mean among responses.  The next areas of concern were the involvement of management 
and the involvement of instructors.  All areas of concern had means below the neutral 
point in the Likert scale and skewed towards the Disagree side of the scale.  This means 
that participants tended to disagree that these were strong concerns.  Several managers 
supported their concerns about FAA involvement in their qualitative responses.  One 
said, “The FAA is a political entity.  A change in administration or perhaps a catastrophic 
current event could introduce negatives that are unforeseen at this point.” 
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Management were also asked if they felt an ASAP would improve overall safety 
at ERAU.  In one question, they were asked if it would improve safety because more 
reports would be submitted by IPs.  The mean of the responses were skewed to the 
Disagree side of the Likert scale, tending to disagree that more reports would be 
submitted.  In another question, management was asked if an ASAP would improve 
safety because an ERC would recommend corrective action.  The mean was skewed to 
the Agree side of the Likert scale. 
 Management personnel were asked if they felt an ASAP would have a positive or 
negative impact on safety at ERAU.  The reliability of these questions was tested for a 
relationship.  The Pearson correlation was statistically significant.  The mean of 
responses for management feeling that an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety 
at ERAU was skewed to the Agree side of the Likert scale, indicating that management 
felt an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety at ERAU. 
Management participants were asked who should serve as the management 
representative on the ERC, if an ASAP was implemented.   The most selected person was 
the Director of Aviation Safety followed by Training Manager(s).  The Assistant Chief 
Flight Instructors only received 20% of the selections from managers.  Managers were 
sensitive about who should represent them on the ERC and the impact on perceptions of 
IPs.  Most managers supported having the Director of Aviation Safety continue to 
represent management or having a manager representative in the lower echelon of the 
organization, like a Training Manager. 
Management also selected who they felt should be the pilot representative on an 
ERC.  The most selected position was the IPQC Chairman with 44%.  The second was an 
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IP union executive with 22%.  The third, fourth and fifth were a IPQC representative, 
senior standards IP, and an IP independent of the union, respectively, each with 11%.  
Management overall favored a person affiliated with the IPQC with 55% of the 
selections. 
When managers were asked what they felt motivated IPs to report safety 
concerns, seven of the nine managers responses indicated something similar to the overall 
culture, improving the organization, or helping their peers.  An example from one 
manager was “Desire to improve their environment/system.  Help their peers avoid a 
similar situation.”  Two cited protection from punitive action only. 
IP perception survey and leadership structured interview comparison.  
Several similarities and differences were identified between the data from the IP 
perception survey and the leadership-structured interview.   The similarities could 
strengthen assumptions found in either data set, while differences could identify a 
difference in perceptions between the two levels of the organization. 
One difference is that most managers were somewhat knowledgeable about the 
ASAP, while the majority of IPs had only a basic understanding.   Both IPs and managers 
rated the concern of FAA involvement in an ASAP as the highest concern; based on the 
mean, managers appeared to be slightly less concerned.  Both IPs and managers tended to 
agree an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety.  Both IPs and managers felt that 
safety reporting wouldn‟t necessarily increase or decrease, but that an ERC 
recommending action would improve safety.  Management and IPs had similar opinions 
about who should be the management representative to an ERC, favoring the Director of 
Aviation Safety or a Training Manager.  Managers seemed to favor a nonunion pilot to 
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represent pilots on the ERC, compared to IPs who were split nearly 50/50 between a 
union or IPQC representative.  In addition, managers and IPs agreed about what 
motivated IPs to report safety concerns; both identified “the information benefits the 
organization and peers” as the biggest motivator for submitting safety reports.   
Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data collected from both the IP 
perception survey and the leadership structured interview.  These conclusions can help 
the Flight Training Department make informed decisions about how to proceed with an 
ASAP, if they decide to implement an ASAP.  This study has identified areas of concern 
that should be addressed and how the Flight Training Department could implement an 
ASAP and not negatively impact its current outstanding safety culture. 
Research Questions.  
What currently motivates ERAU instructor pilots to report safety events?  In the 
responses to the IP perception survey, IPs reported that the benefit to the organization and 
peers was what motivated them to submit safety reports.  This was supported by 
interview responses from managers who also felt the biggest motivator for ERAU 
instructor pilots to report safety concerns was the benefit to their organization and their 
peers.  Non-punitive action was identified as the second motivator for IPs to submit 
safety reports.  Lack of certificate protection and not trusting the non-punitive nature of 
the program were the top two factors reported as de-motivators by IPs.  However, IPs‟ 
mean responses showed all de-motivators skewed to the Disagree side of the Likert scale; 
thus de-motivators were not a major issue.  The incentive for reporting under an ASAP is 
that the submitter is offered certain certificate enforcement protection.  Though the FAA 
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feels that certificate enforcement protection strongly motivates pilots to submit safety-
related concerns, it does not seem to be a strong motivator at ERAU.  Though an ASAP 
might motivate IPs to report more, there was no significant evidence supporting this 
premise in either the IP perception survey or the leadership structured interview.  
Would ERAU’s implementation of an ASAP increase safety reporting among 
instructor pilots?  In the IP perception survey, when asked if an ASAP would change 
their reporting habits, IPs indicated they would not submit reports more or less.  As 
identified in the previous research question, though enforcement-related incentives of an 
ASAP may motivate IPs to report safety issues; it was not identified as the biggest 
motivator, nor was it a significant de-motivator for IPs.  In fact, in management 
interviews, several managers expressed their concern about a decrease in reporting 
among IPs because of FAA involvement.   Due to the low level of understanding of the 
ASAP among IPs, more education would be necessary for them to be comfortable.  Also 
they would need to build trust in the ASAP to see its benefits and to stem any decrease in 
reporting.  Hopefully safety reporting would increase over time. 
What concerns exist among instructor pilots and flight department management 
in implementing an ASAP program?  The most notable concern about an ASAP 
presented by both instructor pilots and management was the involvement of the FAA.  In 
light of survey and interview results, both instructor pilots and management identified it 
as the number one concern.  Changing from the current ERAU safety reporting system 
was cited as the second highest concern by both groups.  This was supported by both IPs 
and managers who preferred the Director of Aviation Safety to be involved in safety 
reports on behalf of management; they did not strongly support involving other 
59 
 
management.  Another concern was a decrease in reporting because of FAA involvement.  
The last concern was a lack of understanding of the program among all involved parties, 
which could cause issues including decreased reporting and reduced program 
effectiveness. 
Recommendations 
Further education of flight department staff, specifically instructor pilots, is 
needed in order for all persons to fully understand the ASAP.  Only then can a better-
informed decision be made by instructor pilots and managers to adopt an ASAP.  A 
recommendation for further study is to provide a better education package on the ASAP 
and provide it to all applicable flight department staff and management.  Then the data 
collection devices used in this study could be repeated to see if education changes the 
results in any way. 
Though this study evaluated the possible effect of an ASAP on the ERAU Flight 
Training Department‟s reporting culture, it did not clearly indicate whether the IPs 
wanted to implement an ASAP.  No questions on the IP perception survey pointedly 
asked if the IP wanted ERAU to pursue an ASAP.  Only in the leadership structured 
interview did the researcher ask if ERAU should implement an ASAP, to which ten said 
yes, two said no and one said maybe.  This data from the IPs would be valuable to make 
the decision whether to pursue an ASAP. 
One participant of the leadership structured interview said, “My concern is why 
do the rest of the approximately 40 universities that offer four year college degree [sic] 
with concentration in aviation and the other few thousands [sic] of 141 flight schools in 
the country don‟t have an ASAP program.  Maybe we need to research why.”  This is an 
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intriguing point; of the 61 certificate holders who hold at least one ASAP MOU, only one 
of them is a flight school (FAA, 2011d).  If ERAU was to implement an ASAP today, it 
would be the first aviation college or university to do so and only the second flight 
school.  A recommendation for further study is to survey all FAA part141 flight schools 
and aviation colleges and universities to find out why they do not have an ASAP set up, if 
they plan to set up an ASAP, and what are the reasons for adopting an ASAP or not 
adopting an ASAP. 
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